Real Firmware

Typically, one of the slowest parts of an embedded system is its communication lines. It's pretty common to see a processor running in the MHz range with a serial connection of 96k baud. To make these two different speeds work together, embedded firmware usually fills up a buffer with data and lets a serial driver print on its own time. This setup means we can expect to see code like

for(int i = 0; i < number_of_bytes_to_print; i++)
{
    print_one_byte_to_serial(buffer[i]);
}

This is a pretty vulnerable piece of C. Imagine that we could sneak into the source code and change it to

for(int i = 0; i < really_big_number; i++)
{
    print_one_byte_to_serial(buffer[i]);
}

C compilers don't care that buffer[] has a limited size - this loop will happily print every byte it comes across, which could include other variables, registers, and even source code. Although we probably don't have a good way of changing the source code on the fly, we do have glitches: a well-timed clock or power glitch could let us skip the i < number_of_bytes_to_print check, which would have the same result.

How could this be applied? Imagine that we have an encrypted firmware image that we're going to transmit to a bootloader. A typical communication process might look like:

1. We send the encrypted image ciphertexts over a serial connection
2. The bootloader decrypts the ciphertexts and stores the result somewhere in memory
3. The bootloader sends back a response over the serial port

We have a pretty straightforward attack for this type of bootloader. During the last step, we'll apply a glitch at precisely the right time, causing the bootloader to print all kinds of things to the serial connection. With some luck, we'll be able to find the decrypted plaintext somewhere in this memory dump.

Bootloader Setup

For this tutorial, a very simple bootloader using the SimpleSerial protocol has been set up. The source for this bootloader can be found in chipwhisperer/hardware/victims/firmware/bootloader-glitch. The following commands are used:

• pABCD\n: Send an encrypted ciphertext to the bootloader. For example, this message is made up of the two bytes AB and CD.
• r0\n: The reply from the bootloader. Acknowledges that a message was received. No other responses are used.
• x: Clear the bootloader's received buffer.
• k: See x.

The bootloader uses triple-ROT-13 encryption to encrypt/decrypt the messages. To help you send messages to the target, the script private/encrypt.py prints the SimpleSerial command for a given fixed string. For example, the ciphertext for the string Don't forget to buy milk! is

p516261276720736265747267206762206f686c207a76797821\n

This folder also contains a Makefile to create a hex file for use with the ChipWhisperer hardware. The build process is the same as the previous tutorials: run make from the command line and make sure that everything built properly. If all goes well, the Makefile should print something like

----------------
Device: atxmega128d3

Program:    1706 bytes (1.2% Full)
(.text + .data + .bootloader)

Data:        248 bytes (3.0% Full)
(.data + .bss + .noinit)


Built for platform CW-Lite XMEGA

-------- end --------

The Sensitive Code

Inside bootloader.c, there are two buffers that are used to store most of the important data. The source code shows:

#define DATA_BUFLEN 40
#define ASCII_BUFLEN (2 * DATA_BUFLEN)

uint8_t ascii_buffer[ASCII_BUFLEN];
uint8_t data_buffer[DATA_BUFLEN];

This tells us that there will be two arrays stored somewhere in the target's memory. The AVR-GCC compiler doesn't usually try too hard to move these around, so we can expect to find them back-to-back in memory; that is, if we can read past the end of the ASCII buffer, we'll probably find the data buffer.

Next, the code used to print a response to the serial port is

if(state == RESPOND)
{
	// Send the ascii buffer back 
	trigger_high();
	
	int i;
	for(i = 0; i < ascii_idx; i++)
	{
		putch(ascii_buffer[i]);
	}
	trigger_low();
	state = IDLE;
}

This looks very similar to the example code given in the previous section, so it should be vulnerable to a glitching attack. The goal is to cause the loop to continue past its regular limit: data_buffer[0] is the same as ascii_buffer[80], so a successful glitch should dump the data buffer for us.

Disassembly

As a final step, let's check the assembly code to see exactly what we're trying to glitch through. Run the command

avr-objdump -m avr -D bootloader.hex > disassembly.txt

and open disassembly.txt. If you know what to look for, you should find a snippet that looks something like:

 376:	89 91       	ld	r24, Y+
 378:	0e 94 06 02 	call	0x40c	;  0x40c
 37c:	f0 e2       	ldi	r31, 0x20	; 32
 37e:	cf 37       	cpi	r28, 0x7F	; 127
 380:	df 07       	cpc	r29, r31
 382:	c9 f7       	brne	.-14     	;  0x376

This is our printing loop in assembly. It has the following steps in it:

• Look at the address Y and put the contents into r24. Increase the address stored in Y. (This is the i++ in the loop.)
• Call the function in location 0x40c. Presumably, this is the location of the putch() function.
• Compare r28 and r29 to 0x7F and 0x20. Unless they're equal, go back to the top of the loop.

There's one quirk to notice in this code. In the C source, the for loop checks whether i < ascii_idx. However, in the assembly code, the check is effectively whether i == ascii_idx! This is even easier to glitch - as long as we can break past the brne instruction once, we'll get to the data buffer.